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ABSTRACT
IP spoofing enables reflection and amplification attacks, which
cause major threats to the current Internet infrastructure. Detecting
IP packets with incorrect source addresses would help to improve
the situation. This is easy at the attacker’s network, but very chal-
lenging at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) or in transit networks.
In this reproducibility study, we revisit the paper Detection, Classi-
fication, and Analysis of Inter-Domain Traffic with Spoofed Source IP
Addresses published at ACM IMC 2017 [8]. Using data from a differ-
ent IXP and from a different time, we were not able to reproduce
the results. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that the current state
of art does introduce a methodology that does not comply with
common real-world deployment.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Networks→Routing protocols;Networkmeasurement; Se-
curity protocols; Public Internet;
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1 INTRODUCTION
IP spoofing injects packets that include an IP source address, which
is not advertised to the routing by its origin network. Consequently,
any reply is directed not to its origin but to a different destination.
In combination with a distributed amplification, in which small
requests trigger much larger replies, this leads to serious denial of
service attacks in the current Internet [7, 14].
The most effective mitigation of reflection attacks [14] is ingress
filtering at the network of the attacker [2, 5]. This solution, however,
is not sufficiently deployed [6]. An alternative solution [8] proposes
a heuristic at central Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) following the
observation that a valid packet should flow compliant with control
plane information, and hence should reach the IXP via a customer
cone that contains its origin. This paper recently published at ACM
IMC 2017 claims that a method is presented “to passively detect
packets with spoofed IP addresses [...] and minimize false positive
inferences” [8, § 1]. Central to this approach is a reliable inference
of customer cones from BGP data, which poses the major challenge.
In this paper, we report on our attempts to reproduce the cur-
rent state of the art, based on a different team and setup [1]. At
different times, we analyze data from a large regional IXP instead
of data from a large European IXP, which should not affect the
validity of the method. Unfortunately, our findings largely differ
from those presented in IMC’17, even though we explore various
ways of inferring the customer cones. In particular, spoofed traf-
fic classified in our experiments exceeds the values of IMC’17 by
orders of magnitude with a traffic mix that strongly indicates a
dominant portion of false positives. We identify plausible reasons
for these discrepancies from further analyses. It is worth noting
that our insights are independent of the vantage point and time but
highlight intrinsic drawbacks of the previous methodology. Later
research [11] will confirm our results.
In the remainder, we recap the methodology in Section 2, intro-
duce our implementation and data sources in Section 3, present and
discuss results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
2 RECAP OF IMC’17 METHODOLOGY
The objective of the proposed approach [8] is to sort invalid (spoofed)
traffic from regular (non-spoofed). Before classifying packets into
theses two categories the traffic is sanitized by filtering bogon pack-
ets, i.e., packets with addresses from private networks and other
ineligible routable prefixes [4, 13, 16], as well as unrouted packets,
i.e., packets from sources that do not show any announcements.
For the remaining packets entering the IXP via an IXP member, a
check is required whether each packet arrives via a customer cone
that covers the prefix of the origin AS. Such a customer cone in-
cludes all ASes that receive (indirect) upstream via the IXP member
and includes transitive peering.
Due to the limited visibility of BGP relations and the lack of
vantage points, it is a major challenge to correctly infer these cones.
Three approaches are proposed in [8] (names taken from the paper):
(1) Naive Approach. Built from public BGP information, this
approach considers a packet valid if it originates from an AS that is
part of an announced path for its source prefix. It aims to reflect
the topology but falls short in representing business relationships
between ASes accurately. Live data provides sufficient information
to deploy it.
(2) CAIDACustomer Cone. In contrast to the naive cone, CAIDA
represents the business relationships rather than the topology. It is
created by information such as community strings, directly reported
relations, and historic information. Further details are available
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Figure 1: Time series of classified traffic distributions
in AS Relationships, Customer Cones, and Validation by Luckie et
al. [10].
(3) Full Cone. This extended cone is built from the assumption
that ASes neighboring in an announcement are tranistively peer-
ing. Built from public BGP announcements this approach adds
transitive relationships between all peers. Even though this might
misinterprete or miss business relationships it results in the largest
cone.
Multi-AS Organization Extension:. This add-on can be com-
bined with the CAIDA Customer Cone and the Full Cone. It adds
information about sibling ASes by building connections between
ASes belonging to the same multi-AS organization [3], thus allow-
ing a bidirectional data exchange between them.
Using these three cones packets can be classified either as in-
valid (spoofed) or as regular. The full cone approach is the main
method examined in the IMC’17 paper and the basis for most of its
evaluation. In our reproducibility study, we consider the various
approaches of cone construction and analyse its different impacts
on the packet classification.
3 IMPLEMENTION AND DATA SOURCES
Software. This study performed replicability and reproducibility
work in two phases. First, we replicated the results by applying
scripts kindly provided by the IMC’17 authors [9] to our data sets.
These scripts supported constructing the full cone from BGP data,
which is taken as the indicator of invalid packets. We augmented
these scripts with helper tools for (i) reading output from tool
bgpdump, and (ii) detecting bogon and unrouted packets. This step
served as baseline to verify that our data can be processed as ex-
pected. All further results in this paper are based on the second
phase, the reproduction.
For the reproduction, we re-implemented all methods to con-
struct all cones (i.e., Naive, CAIDA, and Full cone) and to detect
bogon and unrouted packets. Based on this reimplementation, we
added enhanced features for classifying payloads of spoofed traffic
using libpcap1. While carefully confirming consistency with the
original scripts, our extended toolset allowed for a more accurate
1https://www.tcpdump.org/
analysis of the classification, as discussed later in more detail. The
software is available at
https://github.com/inetrg/reproducibility-study-ixp-spoofing.
Data sources. Our traffic analysis is based on sampled flow data
from a large regional Internet Exchange Point in Europe. We con-
sider two different time periods, February 19-25, 2018 and June 1-
7, 2019. All results shown in this paper are based on the week in
Februrary 2018, while we used the June 2019 data to verify the
stability of our results.
To construct the cones and to identify unrouted prefixes, we uti-
lize BGP data from all route collectors available in BGPStream [12],
for the corresponding weeks as well as one day before and one
day after.
4 RESULTS
We show a first glance of the overall results in Table 1. Our results
resemble those of IMC’17 for the amount of invalids based on the
naive and CAIDA cones but diverge significantly for invalids based
on the full cone and the classification of bogon and unrouted traffic.
It is worth noting that the method of classifying bogon and un-
routed traffic is well-known and not specific to the IMC’17 proposal.
Observed divergences are not surprising but rather reflect differ-
ent states of deployment in time and place. For example, as bogon
Table 1: Comparison of the different classification results
for anomalous traffic. Significant differences highlighted
in gray.
IMC 2017 This study
Bytes Packets Bytes Packets
Bogon 0.003% 0.02% 0.0009% 0.0022%
Unrouted 0.004% 0.02% 0.00001% 0.0001%
Invalid
Naive 1.1% 1.29% 0.579% 1.537%
CAIDA 0.19% 0.3% 0.955% 1.563%
Full 0.0099% 0.03% 0.2% 0.488%
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Figure 2: CCDF of the fractions of anomalous traffic per IXP member AS
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Figure 3: CDF of packets sizes by category
traffic is a typical anomaly from misconfigured NATs, fluctuations
between deployments are likely.
The decline of invalids in the full cone, however, do surprise.
IMC’17 finds 20 times less invalid bytes after extending the CAIDA
cone with additional peering links, whereas we see only a reduction
to more than one fifth. Similarly, packet numbers drop for IMC’17
down to one tenth, while ours decrease by a factor of three. The
largely enhanced impact of the IMC’17 full cone leads to a notable
reduction of traffic classified as invalid. Neither by adding (fairly
effectless) multi-AS organisation extensions (see Section 2), nor by
varying input data sets, we could reproduce these strong effects.
In the remainder of this section, we will analyze the invalid traffic
and the impact of cone construction in more detail.
4.1 Discrepancies for Invalid Traffic
Figure 1 displays the underlying time series of classified traffic for
the different cone types. Absolute numbers have been rescaled by
a common factor to fit the IMC’17 range. Corresponding results
from IMC’17, which are only available for the full cone approach,
are indicated by the shaded regions.
It is clearly visible that the different, stepwise increasing of cones
enfold a moderate impact on the traffic fraction that is classified
as invalid. Packet numbers marked as invalid drop less than one
order of magnitude when moving from the naive to the full cone
approach. This is in contrast to the IMC’17 results, which show
invalids of almost two orders of magnitude less than our results for
the full cone.
We compare the fractions of anomalous traffic as contributed
from the IXP members in Figure 2. A large group of IXP members
issue only a very small portion of invalid packets—some of which
disappearing for the full cone approach. Still no member has more
than 1% of its traffic classified as either bogon, unrouted, or invalid.
This is in strong contrast to the results of IMC’17, where a few
members emit close to 100 % of their entire traffic to invalid, i.e.,
almost all traffic of these ASes is identified as spoofed.
Given these significant discrepancies between our reproduced
results and IMC’17 for the fraction and the distribution of traffic
classified as invalid, we question the correctness of classification
by taking a closer look at the invalid packets.
First, we inspect the observed packet sizes per category. Consid-
ering that spoofed packets are often used for amplification attacks,
a larger amount of small invalid packets would be in support of the
classification results. Figure 3 shows the packet size distributions.
All three approaches exhibit a similar distribution of regular
packet sizes with most packets larger than 1200 bytes. In contrast,
bogon and unrouted traffic is overwhelmingly made up of small
packets. Invalid packets tend to be smaller but vary between the
approaches. Still sizes of invalid packets show a wide distribution
with significant portions of large packets. This again is in contrast
to the IMC’17 results, which show a sharp cut-off for packet sizes
larger than ≈ 900 Bytes.
4.2 Traffic Mix Reveals False Positives
We are now diving deeper into packet inspection of the traffic clas-
sified as invalid and want to understand its characteristics. Table 2
explores the traffic mix and lists the top destination port distri-
butions of invalid UDP and TCP packets. We cannot equivalently
compare to the IMC’17 results, as their traffic mix has not fully
been disclosed.
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Table 2: Traffic mix per protocol and destination port of invalid packets from the reproduced full cone
ICMP total0.37 %
UDP 53 123 161 443 19302 ephemeral other total1.18 % < 0.1 % 0.35 % 19.73 % 0.18 % 0.94 % 0.81 % 20.36 %
TCP 80 443 27015 10100 ephemeral other total3.50 % 62.29 % 0.00 % 0.00 % – 6.75 % 13.67 % 79.45 %
Table 3: False positive indicators in traffic of the reproduced full cone
SSL over TCP HTTP response ICMP echo reply TCP ACK malformed
Naive Approach 3.985% 0.174% 0.056% 86.188% 0.000%
CAIDA Customer Cone 4.166% 0.134% 0.070% 69.197% 0.000%
CAIDA (multi-AS ext.) 4.166% 0.134% 0.081% 80.148% 0.000%
Full Cone 6.395% 0.117% 0.043% 76.079% 0.001%
Full (multi-AS ext.) 6.512% 0.029% 0.044% 77.350% 0.001%
Strikingly, we find the majority of invalid traffic to be HTTPS
over TCP followed byQuick over UDP, and plainHTTP according to
the transport ports. Typical amplification/reflection attack patterns
such as DNS (UDP 53) and NTP (UDP 123) do not stand out in our
data, even though they were reported to dominate in the IMC’17
results. On the overall, almost 80 % of TCP traffic raises doubts
about its spoofed nature. Rather, this strongly indicates that the
traffic classified as invalid from our data set mainly consists of
regular Web flows and hence has been classified erroneously based
on the previously proposed methodology.
As a further attempt to assess the invalid traffic as classified from
our full cone approach, we test for specific indicators of unspoofed
traffic. We selected the five indicators (1) SSL over TCP, (2) HTTP
responses, (3) ICMP echo replies, (4) TCP packets carrying ACKs,
and (5) malformed packets (e.g., transport port 0) as used by CAIDA.
These indicators are not rigorous, but strong. Injecting packets into
existing TCP connections requires some guesswork and is not easily
deployed on a large scale. TCP packets that carry HTTP responses
or ACKs might be less likely to be spoofed. The presence of an
encrypted channel only strengthens this assumption. Packets that
can easily be dropped by the receiver and neither provoke a reply
nor require action are not attractive for spoofing either. ICMP echo
replies are an example for this category. Looking at the problem
from the opposite direction, malformed packets that would disrupt
communication are more likely to be spoofed than part of regular
traffic. As part of this analysis we looked for packets that use port
zero or the same destination and source address.
Our findings are summarized in Table 3. They clearly indicate
that for any selected cone more than 80 % of the packets carry a
distinct characteristic of unspoofed traffic. We conclude that ap-
plying the method of spoofing detection at IXPs presented in [8]
cannot be reproduced on a quantitative scale, and most likely leads
to results dominated by false positives—and thus contradicts the
original claims.
Pursuing further investigations and private communications
with the authors, we tried to investigate the reasons for these diss-
appointing results. Aside from minor inaccuracies of the method
such as (i) inaccurate timing and updates as well as (ii) disregards
of BGP withdraw messages in the public dump files, and (iii) in-
accurate modeling of transitivity in the BGP routing graph [15],
the construction of the customer cones always suffers severely
from the lack of visibility of BGP relations. This well-known prob-
lem cannot be resolved on a general level. Instead, the authors of
IMC’17 decided to manually inspect the traffic flows and adjust
peering relations accordingly (cf., Section 4.4, “Missing AS Links:”
in [8]). Such manual adjustments of data sets are understandable
for the individual case under exploration. They discard, however,
the presented method from future use in real deployment.
5 CONCLUSION
Following a purely algorithmic approach, we could not reproduce
the results of IMC’17. Instead, the majority of packets identified
as “invalid” appeared as false positives. In trying to reproduce the
paper Detection, Classification, and Analysis of Inter-Domain Traffic
with Spoofed Source IP Addresses [8], we found that the manual
component of the methodology (i) represents the major challenge
in terms of reproducability, and has (ii) a significant effect on the
results; this highlights challenges in deploying approaches based
on current methods in an automated fashion.
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